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Abstract: 
Open innovation (OI) has become increasingly popular as an enterprise strategy in both 
industry and academia, and has been adopted, at least in part, by many companies. Despite 
this popularity, there is a dearth of evaluation of OI efficiency and a lack of suitable 
quantitative indices. In this study, we used both Data Envelopment analysis (DEA) and 
Malmquist techniques to compare the pre- and post-transition levels of performance 
achievement of Procter&Gamble (P&G), a widely recognised and public early adopter of OI, 
with a group of its main competitors. Most detailed analysis of the time-course revealed that 
the innovation efficiency of P&G improved rapidly and substantially after its embracing of 
OI, an effect we term the ‘open rise’. However, there is also a transient decline in R&D 
efficiency at the beginning of OI adoption (‘open dip’) and an unexpected and marked 
decline (‘open drop’) after the peak positive effect. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the publication of Chesbrough’s book in 2003, the concept of open innovation (OI) has 
continued to receive wide attention from practitioners and researchers (West et al, 2014). The 
initial studies of OI tended to focus on successful and early OI adopters and to be descriptive 
conceptually (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2018; Calof et al., 2017), which are essential for 
establishing our understanding on OI. Although the conclusions from most qualitative studies 
demonstrate the belief that OI works on the improvement of organisation's innovation 
capability, it still needs quantitative approach to test the conclusion through measuring the 
efficiency performance of open versus closed innovation (Huizingh, 2011). Because you 
cannot manage it if you cannot measure it (Lamberti et al, 2017), it is also important to 
develop an appropriate metrics system for evaluating the efficiency performance of OI. 
Therefore, this study aims to fill the research gap by developing a metrics system to measure 
the efficiency performance of OI. By investigating the performance of the OI adopter's 
innovation efficiency, we try to answer the research question that how a company's 
innovation efficiency is affected during the process that OI is adopted in its organisation.  
If suitable performance metrics of indices were available and OI were working, there should 
be a positive differential between OI and pre-OI conditions. In order to assess change over 
time, we need indices which can reflect the overall efficiency of innovation process. The 
most suitable candidates are DEA and Malmquist techniques, which have previously been 
applied to assess the efficiency of economic processes with identifiable multiple inputs and 
outputs (Li et al., 2017; Cook et al., 2014). By adapting these techniques and applying them 
longitudinally to time series data, we have created 'indices of OI efficiency' which can show 
change in OI efficiency over time. 
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To explore and validate the efficacy of this approach to metrics, we undertook a comparative 
case study of Procter & Gamble (P&G), an early and public adopter of OI strategy, with a 
clear comment point circa 1999 (Dodgson et al, 2006). For the comparison and validation, 
and to better understand the relative efficacy of open versus closed innovation, we identified 
four leading competitors, based on the categorization of BIS’s ranking of top R&D firm. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The theoritical background and literature review are 
introduced in section 2. Section 3 provides an introduction on the research methods that are 
employed in this research. Section 4 explains the model, research procedure, variable measurement 
and data. Section 5 summarises the empirical results of both DEA and Malmquist Index Analysis. 
Finally, section 6 and section 7 discusses the results and makes the conclusion. 
2. Theoritical Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Open Innovation VS Closed Innovation  
OI (Open Innovation) was defined as the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge 
to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, 
respectively (Chesbrough, 2003). Once OI is adopted, the organization's boundaries become 
permeable and that allows combining the company resources with the external co-operators. 
For closed innovation, companies innovate by using only internal resources. Ideas are 
evaluated during the innovation process, and only the best and most promising ones are 
selected for their development and commercialization. The ones that show less potential are 
abandoned.  
The difference between open and closed innovation is that in the case of closed innovation 
the ideas, inventions, investigations and developments required to place a product in the 
market, are generated within the company (Chesbrough, 2003). However, when applying the 
OI system, the company can use external resources such as technology and at the same time 
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make available their own innovations to other organizations. Under the OI paradigm there is 
an important flow of external knowledge into the organization which turns into projects in co-
operation with external partners and causes the purchase and incorporation of external 
technologies (see Elmquist et al., 2009; Inauen and Schenker-Wicki, 2011). At the same time, 
the innovations generated within the company can be sold as technology and/or industrial 
property to other organizations since either they are not applicable within their business 
model or because the company has no capacity or experience to develop the invention. The 
final result is that some products reach the market by using exclusively internal resources 
from the initial idea up to the commercialization of the final product. Other products are the 
result of incorporating external knowledge at different stages of their development (see 
Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Chesbrough et al., 2006). 
Since the publication of Chesbrough’s book in 2003, the studies on OI have received 
increasing attentions from researchers (West et al, 2014). The initial studies of OI made 
significant contributions in developing the OI concept (see Chesbrough, 2006; Perkmann and 
Walsh, 2007), which has primarily been studied in high-tech industries within the context of 
large firms (Hossain et al., 2016). However, with the development of research on OI, there 
are more studies tried to explore OI in the context of small and medium-sized enterprises (see 
Spender et al., 2017; Usman and Vanhaverbeke, 2017), which helped to extend the research 
focus from inbound open innovation processes to outbound open innovation processes (Enkel 
et al., 2009). A large number of early research on OI are developed based on qualitative 
methods in general (Elmquist et al., 2009), But with the continuous development of the 
concepts related to OI, there are more empirical studies tried to contribute the knowledge of 
OI based on secondary and panel data (Hossain et al., 2016). Laursen and Salter (2006) 
conducted one of the early empirical studies on OI and conceived new concepts to describe 
the nature of a firm’s strategies for accessing external knowledge sources. Combining 47 
6 
 
interviews with secondary data from approximately 800 trade journals, West and Gallagher 
(2006) concluded that open-source software can in many ways enhance competitive 
advantages by using the open innovation concept. One of the serious concerns has been 
voiced in previous research about OI is the lack of empirical evidence about the benefits of 
OI (Wang et al., 2012). To our knowledge, there is no existing research about measuring the 
change of innovation performance for companies that adopt OI strategy. Therefore, this study 
is design to contribute the knowledge of OI by filling this research gap.  
2.2 Evaluation of OI Performance 
Several approaches to the assessment of OI have been put forward in the literature. Cheng 
and Huizingh (2014) applied multiple performance measures (new product/service 
innovativeness, new product/service success, customer performance, and financial 
performance) to assess OI performance. Ahn et al (2016) measured firm's OI performance 
using various indicators, including strategic, financial and technological performance, such as 
achievement of business strategic purpose, an increase in total revenue, an increase in 
technological level and an increase in the degree of in-house development. Bae and Chang 
(2012) verified the relationship between open innovation and performance in the Korean 
manufacturing industry using a new approach rather than employing simple indicators such 
as patents and financial data. Ili et al (2010) summarised the previous research and designed 
management tools to observe the status of OI in the automotive industry. Remneland-
Wikhamn and Wikhamn (2011) designed a three-dimensional assessment tool which they 
utilised to measure the ‘OI climate’ in an organization. Another attempt at introducing an OI 
assessment tool was made by Al-Ashaab et al (2011), who developed an operational 
measurement tool based on the balanced scorecard to measure the outcomes of industry-
university.  
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Most of these previous studies focus on evaluating the circumstances favouring the adoption 
of OI. Only indices which represent outputs of OI adoption have been proposed or developed 
to measure the performance of OI strategy. For example, previous quantitative studies for OI 
normally employed financial indices to reflect the firm’s performance, such as turnover 
relating to new products (e.g., Atuahene-Gima and Wei, 2011; Faems et al, 2010; Laursen 
and Salter, 2006). Although a firm’s financial indices are useful, this may not disclose the 
efficiency of OI strategy since it typically doesn't consider the inputs including R&D 
activities and OI cost in the organizations. In fact, the contradictory results received from 
previous research on OI performance indicate the difficulties in identifying appropriate 
metrics for OI and the lack of systematic measurement on OI efficiency (Ahn et al., 2016; 
West et al., 2014). Therefore, an appropriate metrics system that could monitor the 
performance of OI is still needed (Huizingh, 2011).  
2.3 OI Firms 
The foregoing studies of OI have referred to many case studies of how firms implement OI 
strategy to enhance their innovation and commercial capacity (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; 
Sakkab, 2003; Dyer, 2004). P&G is one of the most famous companies which adopted OI 
strategy at an early date and apparently achieved great success through OI adoption. P&G 
was first studied as an example of adoption of OI in non-high-tech industry by Chesbrough 
(2003). After that, P&G has emerged and been studied as an OI company in a number of 
papers (for example: Chesbrough, 2006; Chesbrough et al., 2006; Gassmann, 2006; Huizingh, 
2011; Lichtenthaler, 2011).  
In June 1999, P&G launched a specific new strategy to increase growth through innovation 
called Organisation 2005 (Dodgson et al, 2006). With adoption of Organisation 2005, the 
firm planned to stimulate innovation by making P&G’s internally focused and fragmented 
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communications more outwardly focused and cohesive (Schilling, 2005). Through these 
efforts, P&G changed its R&D strategy to a ‘Connect and Develop’ strategy and enjoyed 
major success in terms of business growth through new, externally sourced products and 
technology (Gassmann, 2006). The firm announced that they were able to increase their 
product success rate by 50% and the efficiency of their R&D by 60% by introducing OI 
strategy (Gassmann et al, 2010). With more than 35% of the company’s innovations and 
billions of dollars in revenue produced by radical strategy of OI (Huston and Sakkab, 2006), 
to measure whether the adoption of OI strategy has triggered such a big impact on P&G’s 
innovation capability, the performance of the innovation efficiency in P&G is studied in this 
research.  
3. Method 
3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a nonparametric method in operations research and 
economics for the estimation of production frontiers. It is used to empirically measure 
productive efficiency of decision making units (DMUs). Although DEA has a strong link to 
production theory in economics, the tool is also used for benchmarking in operations 
management, where a set of measures is selected to benchmark the performance of 
manufacturing and service operations. In benchmarking, the efficient DMUs, as defined by 
DEA, may not necessarily form a “production frontier”, but rather lead to a “best-practice 
frontier” (Cook, Tone and Zhu, 2014). DEA is referred to as "balanced benchmarking" by 
Sherman and Zhu (2013).  
Non-parametric approaches have the benefit of not assuming a particular functional 
form/shape for the frontier, however they do not provide a general relationship (equation) 
relating output and input. There are also parametric approaches which are used for the 
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estimation of production frontiers (see Lovell & Schmidt 1988 for an early survey). These 
require that the shape of the frontier be guessed beforehand by specifying a particular 
function relating output to input. The relative strengths from each of these approaches can be 
combined in a hybrid method (Tofallis, 2001) where the frontier units are identified by DEA, 
then fitted to a smooth surface. This allows a best-practice relationship between multiple 
outputs and multiple inputs to be estimated.  
Some of the advantages of DEA are (Berg, 2010): 
 no need to explicitly specify a mathematical form for the production function; 
 proven to be useful in uncovering relationships that remain hidden for other 
methodologies; 
 capable of handling multiple inputs and outputs; 
 capable of being used with any input-output measurement; 
 the sources of inefficiency can be analysed and quantified for every evaluated unit. 
Some of the disadvantages of DEA are: 
 results are sensitive to the selection of inputs and outputs; 
 you cannot test for the best specification; 
 the number of efficient firms on the frontier tends to increase with the number of 
inputs and output variables. 
DEA has been widely applied to assess production efficiency using multiple inputs and 
outputs (see, e.g., Lin et al., 2018; Kozmetsky and Yue, 1998; Yeh, 1996). Ground breaking 
work by Rousseau and Rousseau (1997, 1998) proved the potential of DEA-analysis to assess 
R&D activities. Subsequent studies have provided supporting evidence for its use in 
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evaluating innovation efficiency, especially for the high-tech industries (see, e.g., Guan and 
Chen, 2010; Chen et al., 2006; Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et al., 2007; Zhong et al., 2011).  
Two standard variations of the DEA model are used in the present study: the CCR model 
(Charnes et al., 1978) and the BCC model (Banker et al., 1984). The CCR model runs under 
the assumption that production exhibits constant returns to scale. The BCC model, on the 
other hand, assumes that there are variable returns to scale (Wang and Huang, 2007). 
Therefore, in the CCR model there is a linear relation between inputs and outputs; while in 
the BCC model, outputs can increase by a variable percentage, depending on its position on 
the efficiency frontier (Hollanders and Celikel-Esser, 2007). This means that in practice the 
CCR model produces a single index, whereas the BCC produces two indices which reflect 
both pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
The following section describes the two models in more detail. Assume that there are n 
DMUs (decision making units) (              ). Each      contains m inputs        
        and s outputs               . So the m*n input matrix, X, and s*n output matrix, 
Y, represent the data of all n DMUs. The efficiency rate of a unit      can be generally 
expressed as: 
                       
                      
 
      
 
   
      
 
    
 
where               and               are separately output weights and input weights. 
The value of the DEA model in measuring the efficiency of productive unit      lies in 
maximising its efficiency rate, subject to the condition that the efficiency rate of any other 
units must not be greater than one. The model must also include all characteristics relevant, 
that is the weights of all inputs and outputs must not be smaller than zero. We let      be 
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the one which need to be evaluated. Its input-output vector is (     ). Such a model is 
defined as a linear divisive programming model: 
                  
                   
            
This can be converted into a linear programming model which is called CCR model or BCC 
model by adding a constraint.   For each type of model, the relevant constraints are: 
We let      be the one which need to be evaluated. Its input-output vector is (     ).   is 
the efficiency score and   is a n*1 vector of constants.  
The CCR model is: 
     
           
      
    
The BCC model adds a convexity constraint. It is shown as follow: 
     
           
      
     
    
Both the CCR and BCC variants of the DEA model are employed in this research. This 
permits the calculation of three critical indices: the technical efficiency (TE) score, pure 
technical efficiency (PTE) score and scale efficiency (SE) score. The TE score is calculated 
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as the ratio of the actual productivity to the maximum attainable productivity (Sharma and 
Thomas, 2008). It is calculated in the CCR DEA model under the assumption of constant 
returns to scale: in this case, the maximum attainable productivity is presented as the distance 
from the constant returns to scale frontier.  The PTE score is calculated in the BCC DEA 
model as the ratio of the actual productivity to the maximum attainable productivity: in this 
case, the maximum attainable productivity represents the distance from the variable returns to 
scale frontier, which means, in contrast to the TE score, the PTE score excludes scale effects 
(Gulati, 2011). The SE score can be derived from the BCC model if the technology exhibits 
variable returns to scale. If there is a difference between the TE score and PTE score for a 
particular sector DMU, then this unit is characterized by scale inefficiency (Wang and Huang, 
2007). The SE score is then defined as the ratio of constant returns to scale Technical 
Efficiency to the Variable Returns to Scale Technical Efficiency (Sharma and Thomas, 2008). 
Once the BCC is established, the analysis can be used to determine whether a particular 
DMU is experiencing increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale (Chen et al., 2006). 
Thus the DEA analysis process as adapted here generates three key indices: the SE scores, 
PTE scores and TE scores. These scores can then be used to evaluate the R&D investment 
efficiency by industry, sector, or company over time.  
3.2 Malmquist Index Analysis 
The Malmquist index we use was derived by Fare et al. (1994), based on Shephard’s work 
(1970), defined as: 
Mt，t+1=  
Here is the distance function given by Shephard (1970), given by the following 
equation:  
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= ； 
P(X) is the set of production possibilities of a firm at a certain technology point. 
Actually, the distance function represents the distance from the production 
configuration  to the system frontier at time t, and can be determined by the following 
model: 
=min  
              
(CCR)s.t.         
               
In this representation the distance function is the efficiency function value. Malmquist could 
be divided (Fare et al., 1994) into:  
 
Where Te is the technical efficiency improvement; T is technology improvement; S is scale 
efficiency. 
4. Model and Data 
4.1 Model 
Although the OI model provides broader strategy selection throughout its innovation process, 
both OI and Closed Innovation paradigms follow the same principle: minimise the firm’s 
R&D investment inputs, and maximize the firm’s benefit at the same time. In the OI model, 
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R&D inputs could either occur inside or outside of the firm, and the firm could select other 
ways (out-licensing et al.) to increase the corporate profit in addition to marketing and selling 
products. The goal of adopting of this strategy is still to improve the R&D investment 
efficiency i.e. – minimise the R&D inputs and maximise the outputs at the same time. So, by 
observing the variation of the R&D investment efficiency, the performance of the OI model 
could be compared with the performance of closed innovation model (see Figure 1). 
 
4.2 Inputs and Outputs 
The two main inputs selected in this study are R&D expenditure and employee number. The 
R&D expenditure refers to the total R&D expense, covering all projects involving both 
internal and external ones supported by the firm. The R&D expenditure input index has been 
widely used, and found to be suitable in previous studies (Chun et al., 2015; Han et al., 2017; 
Zhong et al., 2011). The R&D personnel input figure includes all staff are engaged in either 
fundamental research, application research or experimental development (Zhong et al., 2011). 
The number of research staff on R&D activities can be taken as the R&D personnel input 
index. In the absence of this data, the employee number is adopted to represent the human 
resource inputs in this study. 
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The main outputs of R&D activities are technical improvement and economic benefit. The 
initial, direct outcome of R&D investment is the technical improvement, estimated in this 
case as the issued patent number. The other key outcome is the economic benefit, estimated 
in this case by the net sales and operating incomes as the final outputs in this study. 
Because of the time needed to complete a R&D, introduce products to market (e.g. packaging, 
pricing and marketing) and gain a market share, there is a sector-dependent time lag for the 
economic consequences and impacts of R&D to show up following the initial R&D ‘priming’ 
investment (Kafouros and Wang, 2012). In this study, we adopted 1-year lag for the issued 
patent number and 2-year lag for the net sales and operating incomes. 
4.3 Case Data Sources 
To reference P&G's performance to other firms from the same sector, four R&D-intensive 
companies from the same sector are selected to do the comparison study. The reference 
companies were picked from the BIS (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in the 
UK)’s R&D ranking of the top 1000 world companies by their R&D spending. BIS’s ranking 
includes all the R&D intensity companies around the world and ranks them based on their 
R&D expenditure. Following the ranking, four companies – Unilever, Henkel, Reckitt 
Benckiser and Clorox, which are the top R&D intensity companies, are selected (see table 1). 
All the five sample companies are from ‘Nondurable household products’ sector based on the 
categorization by BIS’s R&D ranking of the top 1000 world companies. Although the other 
four companies are all innovation-intensive, P&G is the only company that is reported as a 
famous practitioner of OI strategy in this industry (see Gassmann et al., 2010; Huston and 
Sakkab, 2006).   
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The data’s time series is from 1990 to 2018. And much of the data required was available 
from official government sources and established business databases. The R&D expenditure, 
the employee number, net sales and operating incomes were collected from Datastream 
(Thomson Reuters) and the issued patent number was collected from the database offered by 
United States patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). All monetary values are adjusted for 
inflation using the US domestic manufacturing Producer Price Index (with index year 1989). 
5. Results 
5.1 DEA Result  
5.1.1 Technical Efficiency 
In the DEA analyses, the TE scores reflect the overall R&D investment efficiency: the bigger 
the score, the higher the R&D efficiency. A firm has the highest possible R&D efficiency if 
its score is 1 in a given year. The detailed results are shown below. Based on the average 
score for the period 1990 to 1999 (pre-open period), Reckitt Benckiser was the most efficient 
company on R&D among these five companies. Clorox and Unilever were ranked second and 
third, and P&G was the least efficient R&D Company, with Unilever only slightly better than 
Unilever. For the period 2000 to 2016 (post-open period), P&G’s average R&D efficiency 
across the whole period rose significantly, second, only to Reckitt Benckiser. Clorox ranked 
Table 1: the sample firms in this research   
Firm Name Founded Revenue (2018) 
Number of 
employees (2018) 
Procter & Gamble 1837; 181 years ago US$66.83 billion 95,000 
Unilever 1929; 89 years ago €50.982 billion 155,000 
Henkel 1876; 143 years ago €19,899 million 53,000 
Reckitt Benckiser 1999 (merger of Reckitt & Colman and Benckiser) £12.597 billion 40,000 
Clorox 1913; 106 years ago US$6.1 billion 8,700 
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third, though its average score was higher than for pre-open period. Unilever and Henkel, 
which both showed the lower R&D efficiency, ranked fourth and last (see Table 2). 
Table 2 DEA technical efficiency index 
Year of 
R&D 
activity 
input 
Firm 
P&G Unilever Henkel 
Reckitt 
Benckiser Clorox 
1990 0.522 0.572 0.448 1 0.537 
1991 0.479 0.629 0.411 1 0.446 
1992 0.433 0.634 0.403 1 0.516 
1993 0.458 0.601 0.413 0.974 0.64 
1994 0.507 0.604 0.507 0.888 0.7 
1995 0.498 0.514 0.635 0.722 0.819 
1996 0.504 0.473 0.639 0.73 0.841 
1997 0.515 0.515 0.564 0.995 1 
1998 0.48 0.521 0.576 0.948 0.898 
1999 0.467 0.542 0.538 0.781 0.733 
Average 
1990-
1999 0.486 0.561 0.513 0.904 0.713 
2000 0.545 0.452 0.364 0.826 0.791 
2001 0.615 0.436 0.337 0.776 0.787 
2002 0.7 0.389 0.463 0.731 0.815 
2003 0.768 0.377 0.511 0.744 0.699 
2004 0.831 0.39 0.512 0.843 0.648 
2005 1 0.431 0.453 0.911 0.724 
2006 0.791 0.515 0.451 0.866 0.696 
2007 0.737 0.644 0.458 1 0.806 
2008 0.735 0.588 0.431 1 0.797 
2009 0.601 0.526 0.442 0.918 0.604 
2010 0.681 0.55 0.48 0.93 0.601 
2011 0.655 0.544 0.493 0.921 0.64 
2012 0.678 0.537 0.49 0.686 0.61 
2013 0.689 0.524 0.56 0.628 0.666 
2014 0.695 0.681 0.597 0.948 0.736 
2015 0.736 0.72 0.526 1 0.795 
2016 0.743 0.602 0.494 0.955 0.743 
Average 
2000-
2016 0.718 0.524 0.474 0.864 0.715 
 
P&G’s average R&D efficiency in the pre-open period was 0.486, the lowest in relation to 
the reference companies. The average R&D efficiency score of the five companies in the pre-
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open period is 0.673 which is higher than P&G’s performance. The situation changed 
dramatically after 1999 when P&G launched its OI initiatives. Over the post-open period 
P&G’s average score of R&D efficiency is 0.718 which is the second most efficient of all the 
firms. In Figure 2, we develop a comparison of R&D efficiency between P&G and the other 
four companies' average level. With the average score0.644, the average level of R&D 
efficiency performance for the other four companies was flat during the whole test period 
(see Figure 2). This may indicate that the general performance of the companies' R&D 
efficiency is not affected by the macroeconomic environment such as the economic recession 
in 2007. 
 
Because Unilever is widely recognised as P&G's big competitor (Iguchi and Hayashi, 2009),a 
comparison of R&D efficiency of P&G and Unilever is developed in this research (see Figure 
3). We can see that P&G’s R&D efficiency kept increasing monotonically from 2000 to its 
post-open peak in 2005. Strikingly, at the peak P&G’s R&D efficiency score (value) was 
more than double that of Unilever’s (value) (see Figure 3). Intriguingly, the DEA model also 
disclosed an equally sharp decline in P&G’s Technical Efficiency score over the five years 
from 2005 to 2009. 
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Figure 2: The Comparison of R&D Efficiency between P&G and 
the Other Four Companies' Average Level 
P&G Average level 
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5.1.2 Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) 
The PTE scores reflect the pure R&D investment efficiency excluding scale effects. Reckitt 
Benckiser owned the highest average PTE score during the pre-open period. Clorox and 
Unilever followed it, ranking second and third, with P&G fourth. Over the post-open period, 
P&G became the most efficient company on PTE with an average score 0.902,with Reckitt 
Benckiser and Unilever second and third and Henkel last (Table 3). 
Table 3 DEA pure technical efficiency index 
Year of 
R&D 
activity 
input 
Firm 
P&G Unilever Henkel 
Reckitt 
Benckiser Clorox 
1990 0.941 0.914 0.591 1 1 
1991 0.871 0.994 0.534 1 0.851 
1992 0.782 0.981 0.524 1 0.912 
1993 0.79 0.935 0.533 0.974 1 
1994 0.784 0.984 0.666 0.96 0.971 
1995 0.713 0.774 0.865 0.857 1 
1996 0.768 0.706 0.872 0.876 1 
1997 0.745 0.761 0.774 0.998 1 
1998 0.648 0.765 0.806 0.948 0.899 
1999 0.615 0.776 0.773 0.785 0.733 
Average 
1990-
1999 0.766 0.859 0.694 0.940 0.937 
2000 0.635 0.653 0.492 0.832 0.813 
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Figure 3: the comparison of R&D investment efficiency 
between P&G and Unilever 
P&G Unilever 
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2001 0.694 0.613 0.486 0.778 0.819 
2002 0.822 0.534 0.632 0.745 0.823 
2003 0.896 0.512 0.703 0.768 0.713 
2004 0.937 0.531 0.703 0.857 0.663 
2005 1 0.591 0.635 0.941 0.724 
2006 1 0.705 0.634 0.879 0.712 
2007 1 0.902 0.642 1 0.807 
2008 0.94 0.822 0.625 1 0.818 
2009 0.901 0.776 0.642 0.947 0.635 
2010 0.972 0.801 0.7 0.944 0.638 
2011 1 0.792 0.711 0.922 0.66 
2012 0.997 0.751 0.709 0.692 0.633 
2013 0.978 0.75 0.837 0.642 0.666 
2014 0.888 0.949 0.885 0.949 0.736 
2015 0.824 1 0.818 1 0.796 
2016 
0.855 0.865 0.756 1 0.743 
Average 
2000-
2016 0.902 0.738 0.683 0.876 0.729 
 
Figure 4 shows a comparison of PTE performance between P&G and the other four 
companies' average Level. As for the TE analysis, here we use the average PTE score of the 
other four companies as the index to represent the general performance of the other 
companies on PTE score. P&G has showed a higher PTE score than the average level of the 
other companies since 2001. In the post-open period, P&G showed the highest score and a 
more stable PTE performance. This seems to suggest that the adoption of OI strategy has 
improved innovation productivity in P&G. Moreover, comparing with its TE score, which 
exhibited ‘inverted curvilinear performance’, P&G’s PTE exhibited a more stable 
performance after reaching the peak in 2005.  
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5.1.3 Scale Efficiency (SE) 
Scale efficiency (SE) scores reflect various classes and levels of returns to scale on R&D 
investment. There are three possible classes of returns to scale: decreasing (DRS), increasing 
(IRS) and constant (CRS). CRS is indicated by an SE score of 1; DRS, signified by a 
decrease in the relative output for a given incremental input, and an associated decline in the 
consequent profit; IRS, signified by an increase in the relative output for a given incremental 
input.  
In the pre-open period, Reckitt Benckiser and Clorox were first and second on average SE 
score. Both of them were experiencing increasing return to scale (IRS), indicates that a given 
level of R&D inputs was producing a relative increase in R&D output in these two companies. 
Henkel, Unilever and P&G were ranked third, fourth and fifth respectively. All these three 
companies were suffering from decreasing returns to scale (DRS), indicating that for a given 
level of increase in the R&D input, less relative R&D output was produced. In the post-open 
period, Reckitt Benckiser and Clorox were still ranked at first and second for the average SE 
score, while P&G has moved from fifth to third, and Henkel had the lowest average score. 
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Figure 4: The Comparison of PTE score between P&G and the 
Other Four Companies' Average Level 
P&G Average level 
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During this time post-open period, all five companies suffered from DRS at some point (see 
Table 4).  
Table 4 DEA scale efficiency index  
Year of 
R&D 
activity 
input 
Firm 
P&G Unilever Henkel 
Reckitt 
Benckiser Clorox 
1990 0.555 drs 0.626 drs 0.759 drs 1 - 0.537 irs 
1991 0.55 drs 0.633 drs 0.769 drs 1 - 0.524 irs 
1992 0.554 drs 0.647 drs 0.768 drs 1 - 0.566 irs 
1993 0.58 drs 0.643 drs 0.774 drs 1 - 0.64 irs 
1994 0.647 drs 0.613 drs 0.761 drs 0.925 irs 0.722 irs 
1995 0.699 drs 0.664 drs 0.734 drs 0.842 irs 0.819 irs 
1996 0.656 drs 0.67 drs 0.733 drs 0.834 irs 0.841 irs 
1997 0.691 drs 0.676 drs 0.729 drs 0.997 drs 1 - 
1998 0.741 drs 0.681 drs 0.715 drs 1 - 0.998 irs 
1999 0.76 drs 0.698 drs 0.696 drs 0.995 drs 1 - 
Average 
1990-
1999 0.643   0.655   0.744   0.959   0.765   
2000 0.858 drs 0.693 drs 0.74 drs 0.993 drs 0.972 irs 
2001 0.887 drs 0.711 drs 0.694 drs 0.997 drs 0.961 irs 
2002 0.852 drs 0.728 drs 0.733 drs 0.981 irs 0.991 irs 
2003 0.858 drs 0.735 drs 0.726 drs 0.969 irs 0.981 irs 
2004 0.887 drs 0.735 drs 0.729 drs 0.984 irs 0.976 irs 
2005 1 - 0.73 drs 0.714 drs 0.968 irs 1 - 
2006 0.791 drs 0.73 drs 0.711 drs 0.985 irs 0.976 irs 
2007 0.737 drs 0.714 drs 0.714 drs 1 - 0.999 - 
2008 0.782 drs 0.715 drs 0.69 drs 1 - 0.973 drs 
2009 0.667 drs 0.677 drs 0.689 drs 0.969 drs 0.953 irs 
2010 0.701 drs 0.687 drs 0.686 drs 0.986 drs 0.942 irs 
2011 0.655 drs 0.686 drs 0.693 drs 0.999 irs 0.969 irs 
2012 0.68 drs 0.715 drs 0.691 drs 0.991 drs 0.963 irs 
2013 0.704 drs 0.698 drs 0.669 drs 0.979 drs 1 - 
2014 0.783 drs 0.717 drs 0.675 drs 0.999 irs 1 - 
2015 0.894 drs 0.72 drs 0.644 drs 1 - 0.999 irs 
2016 0.869 drs 0.695 drs 0.653 drs 0.955 drs 0.999 irs 
Average 
2000-
2016 0.800   0.711   0.697   0.986   0.980   
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P&G’s SE score showed a similar pattern to its TE score. P&G’s SE score increased after 
1996 and reached a peak in 2005, followed by a subsequent decline (Figure 10). Adopted the 
average SE score as an index to show the general performance of the other companies on SE 
score, from the comparison we could see that P&G had lower Scale Efficiency (SE) than the 
average level of the other companies before 2000. But from 2002-2006 the company made an 
inverted curvilinear performance and surpassed the average performance on this index, only 
to return to lower performance again after 2006 (Figure 5).  
 
 
5.2 Malmquist Results 
Table 5 shows the results of the Malmquist test. In the Malmquist test, a score larger than 1 
means that the efficiency of the DMU has improved in the test year compared with the 
previous year. Conversely, if the score is smaller than 1, it indicates that the DMU is less 
efficient than in the last year. A score at or very near to 1 means there are no change during 
the two years. Therefore, based on the result, we can say that the R&D efficiency of P&G had 
constantly improved since its adoption of OI strategy in year 1999. It strongly supports the 
conclusion of previous qualitative studies, and demonstrates the significant benefit of OI 
strategy for P&G. Even compared with the other four firms, the development trend of R&D 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
5
 
2
0
1
6
 
Figure 5: The Comparison of SE score between Procter & 
Gamble and the Other Four Companies' Average Level 
P&G Average level 
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efficiency for P&G is still obvious, especially compared with its big competitor Unilever 
which had experienced several years’ decline of R&D efficiency after year 1999. Intriguingly, 
P&G’s R&D efficiency score has declined since 2006.  
Table 5 Malmquist index         
Firm Year of R&D activity input         
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
P&G 1 0.948 0.994 1.248 1.059 1.175 0.97 1.355 0.834 
Unilever 1 1.041 1.043 1.065 1.005 0.897 1.023 1.353 0.949 
Henkel 1 0.935 1.039 1.131 1.04 1.071 1.066 1.326 0.899 
Reckitt 
Benckiser 1 1.04 0.974 0.96 0.956 0.815 0.968 1.278 0.966 
Clorox 1 0.932 1.159 1.234 1.075 1.167 1.038 1.271 0.865 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
P&G 0.567 1.108 1.112 1.163 1.084 1.07 1.138 0.851 1.035 
Unilever 0.822 1.064 0.93 0.954 0.993 1.122 1.051 0.966 1.144 
Henkel 0.828 1.069 0.977 1.071 0.918 1.039 1.043 0.968 1.098 
Reckitt 
Benckiser 0.851 1.096 1.001 0.957 1.01 1.167 1.105 0.985 1.199 
Clorox 0.651 1.153 1.019 1.062 0.917 0.981 1.072 0.954 1.087 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
P&G 0.987 0.806 1.088 0.988 1.02 1.008 1.068 1.06 0.935 
Unilever 0.949 0.891 0.984 0.922 0.865 0.825 1.445 1.141 1.001 
Henkel 0.979 0.889 0.991 1.016 0.917 0.933 1.214 1.002 0.967 
Reckitt 
Benckiser 0.984 0.893 1.027 0.919 0.789 0.88 1.474 1.102 0.975 
Clorox 0.973 0.811 1.02 1.08 0.953 1.032 1.094 0.999 0.935 
 
6. Discussion 
Our first finding is that P&G’s average scores for all three indices increased in the post-open 
period when compared with pre-open period, while the average scores for all 3 indices across 
the other four companies were effectively flat for the whole period. All three primary ‘indices” 
of innovation follow a similar ‘curvilinear’ developmental sequence, with a characteristic 
initial dip, followed by a significant rise and then a drop of similar magnitude and ratio, 
except that the PTE scores did not show any drop.  
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Given the flat, stable, performance of the reference group, and the magnitude and duration of 
the change, we consider the simplest interpretation of the ‘Open Rise’ at P&G to be that it 
does indeed reflect a positive effect of the switch to an OI strategy.  The transient ‘Open Dip’ 
could reasonably be interpreted as a temporary loss of efficiency during transition to the new 
strategy.  The ‘Open Drop’ observed was unexpected, as was its magnitude, and invites a 
number of possible interpretations ranging from absorption of the relevant market 
opportunities to inconsistent execution of partnering activities: in any event, not what 
adopters of OI are seeking.  Further research on indices may identify other cases of the 
observed ‘Open Drop’, which so far as we are aware has not been reported previously (see 
Figure 6).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
As both the DEA and MI analyses revealed, the overall indices of R&D performance 
exhibited an ‘inverted curvilinear’ profile. The graphical profile observed for P&G in this 
study supports the previous conclusion of Laursen and Salter (2006), based on a Tobit 
regression analysis of the UK manufacturing sector. From which they concluded that 
‘searching widely and deeply is curvilinear relative to performance’, based on the ‘inverted 
curvilinear’ relationship they observed between OI and firm performance. Our interpretation 
is that at one extreme the risk may be to set the research net too wide and catch an 
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unmanageable number of opportunities and at the other to set it too narrow and catch too little. 
Another implication would be that secondary management indicators of performance trends 
that correlate with the overall econometric performance indices applied here would be useful 
additions to the management toolset for informed innovation.  
With respect to the individual indices, since PTE reflects pure R&D efficiency exclusive of 
Scale Efficiency, we can also conclude that the pure R&D efficiency of P&G increased after 
the OI adoption point, again supporting the notion that the adoption of OI strategy appears to 
have helped the company improve its pure R&D efficiency. In contrast to the TE result, PTE 
did not show a continuing and obvious decline in the post-open period, leading us to conclude 
that other factors, such as scale effects, must be responsible for the overall decline of R&D 
efficiency at P&G over that period. 
Interestingly, the majority of the companies studied– including P&G – tended to suffer from 
greater decreasing return to scale (DRS) effects in the post-open period than in the pre-open 
period.  Our interpretation of this observation is that in a closed innovation scenario, given 
the limitation of the scope of management to a company boundary and the production 
principles in use inside that boundary, increasing R&D inputs might be expected to follow 
the law of diminishing marginal returns and lead to decreasing R&D outputs. 
In an OI scenario, firms can access and absorb sources of R&D beyond their internal R&D 
activities and can thus expand their R&D horizons and maintain scale efficiency, which was 
account for the ‘Open Rise’ seen in the SE score after adoption of OI. Since the PTE score 
did not show ‘Open Drop’ effect, it maybe that the inverted curvilinear profile of P&G’s 
overall R&D efficiency may be driven or determined by its Scale Efficiency (SE) 
performance. One explanation might be that external R&D projects normally operate outside 
the firm by another organization or individuals, and an increase in external R&D projects 
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could entail a risk that the company who launched the projects loses management control, 
and lead to a reduction of scale inefficiency. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Our quantitative methods appear to meet the needs identified in the preceding literature 
(Huizingh, 2011) for more quantitative approaches to the measurement of OI, which in this 
paper we have attempted to address by applying DEA and Malmquist linear programming 
techniques. Using these techniques, it would appear we have shown a convincing quantitative 
index which track increases in OI efficiency in the case of P&G relative to its competitors.  
Although the most obvious interpretation of the results is that adopting OI can lead to a 
dramatic improvement in R&D performance, other explanations are of course possible.  For 
example, a bull market could have an uplift effect; a change of management might have 
impact, and so forth.  However, the temporal apposition of the effect, the existence of 
parsimonious causal mechanisms, and the lack of similar effects in competitors not making 
the strategic shift to OI – in effect a control – suggest that there may indeed be an effect 
worthy of further investigation with a wider range of cases, and perhaps at sector or industry 
level. The period of adoption also coincided with an extended period of stock market decline: 
the ‘dot bomb’ era, also seeming to rule out any general market.  
Companies who are adopting and will adopt OI strategy should recognise that 
implementation has to be managed and monitored to realize OI efficiency gains. Our research 
appears to suggest that one of key indices to manage is the scale efficiency of R&D within 
the industrial OI ecosystem, where Scale Efficiency may affect OI efficiency in two distinct 
phases, at the initial and later stages of execution.  
Although more efficient R&D is what the companies seek in moving to OI, moving to OI is 
not a guarantee for more efficient R&D: if companies are less than totally prepared for the 
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new management challenges likely to emerge from the strategic transition from closed to 
open, they might for example anticipate problems in R&D source allocation and external 
project control, which in turn could impact the scale inefficiency in the companies’ R&D, and 
this kind of scale inefficiency might be expected at the beginning of OI adoption.  
This study has several potential contributions both in practice and research. Since few studies 
have been concerned with measuring the performance of OI, this study is one of the first to 
provide quantitative indices to evaluate the performance of OI. In this comparative study, the 
relative performance of OI versus closed innovation appears to be a clear win for open, at 
least in one adoptive organization. This finding and these tools should help companies to find 
the right balance and monitor the development of OI in their organizations. With the means 
of measuring the performance of OI, scholars could go beyond the descriptive study and 
pursue further applicable research about the efficacy of OI in a wider range of companies, 
sectors, and industries. For practitioners who plan to do OI, the management control might be 
developed to face the emergence of R&D efficiency deadline at the beginning and later stages 
of OI adoption. For practitioners who are already opened, they should understand staying in 
OI does not mean continuous higher R&D efficiency: management of OI efficiency should be 
paid more attention after the adoption of OI strategy. To keep their successful story, they 
might keep innovative not only for OI but also for OI efficiency.   
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